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Abstract. DTN environment is characterized by intermittent connectivity, 
high/variable delay, heterogeneity, high error rate and asymmetric data rate 
amongst others. These characteristics accounts for the poor behavior of Internet 
protocols in this environment. To address these problems, DTN was conceived 
and designed together with specialized protocols to carry out its services. Its 
emergence called for a new concept in security that was considered at the 
design stage. The main aim of this paper is to propose a traditional 
cryptography based authentication scheme that does not depend on network 
administrator’s availability during post network authentication communication 
and facilitates bundle processing by the recipient in the absence of connectivity. 
In this paper, we present and discuss the system model, the proposed credential 
and the propose authentication scheme. A simulation framework is developed 
for the implementation of the proposed and referenced schemes. From the 
simulation results, the proposed scheme was observed to be independent of 
network administrator’s availability during post network authentication 
communication and facilitates bundle processing in the absence of connectivity.    
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1   Introduction 
Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN) [1-4] is a networking architecture 
designed based on message switching mechanism to provide reliable communication 
in networking environments with long/variable delay, intermittent connectivity, high 
packet loss rates, heterogeneity and asymmetric data rate amongst others using store-
and-forward operation. The poor behavior of existing internet protocols in DTN led to 
the design of specialized protocols like Bundle Protocol (BP) to provide DTN 
services as an overlay network. To facilitate interoperability between heterogeneous 
networks with different network characteristics with DTN, a new layer called Bundle 
Layer was introduced between the application layer and the transport layer of the 
internet protocol stack. The design of DTN and the protocol did not evolve without 
consideration for security which led to the development of relevant security 
documentations [5] [6] to address DTN-related security issues. The security 
documentations highlight security requirements, define design considerations, identify 
possible threats as well as open issues. 
From the DTN security documentations and the security analysis in [7], the 
identified threats this work is designed to address are masquerading, modification and 
replay. To protect the DTN network from these threats, security solutions are required 
to support both hop-by-hop and end-to-end services as well as policy based routing. 
The policy based routing requires that an entity involve in DTN communication must 
be able to verify the authenticity of both the original sender and intermediate 
forwarder of the bundles (messages) as well as the integrity of the received bundles. 
The security blocks required to secure a transmitted bundle are defined and described 
in [6]. Farrell and Cahill in [7] while highlighting the security issues associated with 
designing the bundle to contain all the required keys and algorithm(s) for security 
processing, emphasized the need for an additional authorization checks with PKI as a 
possible solution. The use of PKI is associated with constraints like authorization 
server unavailability and limited capabilities of certain nodes for cryptographic 
operations.  
The focus of this paper is to investigate how PKI concept can be used to provide an 
authentication solution that does not depend on server availability during post trust 
establishment network communication while taking the capabilities of the entities into 
consideration. The existing PKI based schemes in DTN are [1] and [8]. These 
schemes either use certificates and encourage large storage of security credentials or 
depend on server availability. We propose an authentication scheme that combines 
both asymmetric and symmetric cryptography to provide source authentication as 
well as message authentication and integrity. The contributions of this paper are 
summarized as follows: 1) Implementing traditional PKI to provide trust 
initiation/establishment; 2) introducing our proposed Authorization Pass (APass) as a 
substitute for PKI based certificate; 3) proposing a scheme that uses symmetric based 
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for hop-by-hop bundle 
authentication and integrity, and asymmetric based APass for source authentication; 
and 4) evaluating the performance of the proposed and reference schemes through 
simulation.    
2   The System Model 
The DTN environment in fig. 1 assigns a communication satellite to a zone with 
each zone having more than one heterogeneous regional network administered by a 
regional administrator (gateway). Inter-zonal communication is facilitated through 
satellite-to-satellite communication. Hierarchical routing is implemented with each 
satellite maintaining a routing table of all RAs within its zone of location and other 
satellites in the network. Each RA maintains a routing table containing all RAs within 
its zone and the designated zonal satellite for the zone. RAs in the common territories 
between two zones maintain routing tables of RAs in the two zones and the 
designated satellites. The routing tables are computed from the global topology table 
generated and updated by DTNNA each time an entity joins the network. The global 
topology table is accessible whenever DTNNA is online.      
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Fig. 1. DTN-Satellite Scenario  
The use of satellite is aimed at facilitating bundle transmission between partition or 
remote networks that cannot communicate directly either due to obstruction or limited 
range of communication facility. Communication satellites with low computing and 
storage capabilities are now designed to provide data forwarding services. To 
minimize cost, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites designed to accommodate limited 
number of brief contacts at a given time are employed. The limited number of brief 
contacts at a given time might result in discontinuous coverage. To address this issue, 
some LEO satellites are designed to provide DTN concept of store and forward 
services [9]. Security solutions should not be computationally heavy as well as 
encourage large storage of security credentials. 
3   The Proposed APass 
The PKI based digital certificate is considered too heavy for implementation in 
DTN environment. Its usage is associated with revocation and storage of Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL). It is also identified to provide partial trust management since 
it does not bind identity to access rights. To address the above issues, we proposed an 
asymmetric based APass introduced in [10] and shown in fig. 2 which is a 
modification of the digital certificate. The APass excludes entity’s public key 
considered significantly large and incorporates role field to bind entity’s identity to 
authorized action. To offer revocation flexibility and eliminates the storage of CRL, 
the validity end field in the APass is uniform for all APass issued irrespective of when 
the entities join the network while the validity start field differs. 
Authorization Pass
Authentication Sequence: 1
Issuer ID: DTNNA@DTN
Subject ID: RA1@DTN
Validity Start: 10:00:00 GMT Oct 1 2011
Validity End: 24:00:00 GMT Dec 31 2011
Role: A
Issuer Signature RSAwSHA256: XXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXX
 
Fig. 2. The Proposed APass  
An entity stops sending and receiving bundle when its own APass expires until it 
gets a new APass from DTNNA since other entities’ APass are also assumed to have 
expired. DTNNA is assumed to know when a new APass must be generated for the 
entities because allowing the existing APass to expire in the absence of compromise 
will affect network communication.  
4   Authentication Model 
The authentication model is sub-divided into three phases of registration, network 
authentication and data exchange. The registration phase is facilitated by a public 
trusted entity called Registration Authority (RegAuth) which provides security 
information (secInfo) required for network authentication. The network authentication 
phase is facilitated by DTNNA and provides credential required for the data exchange 
phase. The data exchange phase is facilitated by network entities (RAs and DMs) 
using credentials obtained from DTNNA during network authentication for secure 
communication. We assume the entities cannot be compromise and the DMs are part 
of the DTNNA service providing network. Every RA is customized with pre-install 
initial public/private key pair, device identifier (devID) and RegAuth’s public key 
access on activation. For every node (RA) manufactured the vendor provides 
RegAuth with node’s devID and initial public key. Every node generates its public-
private key pair. RAs must pass through the registration/network authentication phase 
to communicate in the DTN overlay network. RegAuth generates security information 
required for network authentication, while DTNNA generates trust information for 
post network authentication communication. 
REGISTRATION/NETWORK AUTHENTICATION: The registration and 
network authentication phases are shown in fig. 3 below. 
Registration Phase:  
RA1→RegAuth: PbRegAuth{rtj DTN network|devIDRA1}  (1) 
RegAuth→RA1: PbRA1{devIDRA1| secInfoRA1|IDDTNNA|secInfoDTNNA|PbDTNNA}  (2a) 
RegAuth→DTNNA: PbDTNNA{nfa|devIDRA1| secInfoRA1}  (2b) 
Network Authentication Phase: 
RA1→DTNNA: PbDTNNA{authReq|devIDRA1| secInfoRA1|PbRA1}  (3) 
DTNNA→RA1: PbRA1{authConf|IDDTNNA|secInfoDTNNA|Kdtn|APassRA1}  (4) 
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Fig. 3. Registration/Network Authentication Phase  
RSA encryption/decryption is used to secure communication with entity’s public 
key used to encrypt and private key to decrypt. DTNNA and RA1 use security 
information from RegAuth for mutual authentication during network authentication 
where received secInfo must match the one obtained from RegAuth. RA1 uses 
PbDTNNA obtained in 2a to encrypt 3 while DTNNA uses PbRA1 obtained in 3 to 
encrypt 4.  
Notations: PbRA1, PbRA7, PbRegAuth, PbDTNNA: Public keys of RA1, RA7, RegAuth 
and DTNNA; secInfoRA1, secInfoDTNNA: Security information of RA1 and DTNNA; 
APassRA1, APassDM25: APass of RA1 and DM25; devIDRA1: Device identifier of RA1; 
Kdtn: Network-wide shared symmetric key; NRA1: Nonce generated by RA1(randomly 
generated string); Tstmp: Bundle’s timestamp; IDDTNNA, IDRA1, IDRA7: Network 
identifiers of DTNNA, RA1 and RA7; CustID: Reserved for network identifiers of the 
data mules; PbRA7{Hello}: Encrypted payload processed only by RA7; {APassRA1| 
NRA1}: Access control block; {Tstmp | IDRA1 | CustID | IDRA1}: Our primary bundle 
block; |: Concatenated operation; rtj: Request to join; nfa: Notification for 
authentication; authReq: Authentication request; authConf: Authentication 
confirmation.  
DATA EXCHANGE PHASE: The entities (RAs/DMs) are assumed to have 
passed through registration/network authentication and in custody of secInfoDTNNA 
and Kdtn for HMAC computation/verification, their respective APass and PbDTNNA for 
DTNNA signature verification. The authenticated resource is the bundle and is 
designed to provide authentication, integrity and confidentiality. Our version of 
bundle and acknowledgement considering the first hop between RA1 and DM25 with 
RA7 as destination in fig. 1 is shown below.  
(1). RA1 → DM25: (PbRA7{Hello}|{APassRA1| NRA1}|{Tstmp|IDRA1 | CustID  |IDRA7}   
                                                     )∙hmac 
(2). DM25 → RA1: (isAccepted | APassDM25 | NRA4)∙hmac 
 
We assumed the entities are communicating for the first time after network 
authentication and PbRA7 was obtained by RA1 when DTNNA was online. RA1 
generates the bundle in (1), append hmac computed using Kdtn and secInfoDTNNA and 
send to DM25. DM25 upon receiving the bundle verifies the hmac by comparing the 
appended hmac with the one it computes using Kdtn and secInfoDTNNA. The bundle 
content is only access if the appended and computed hmacs matches. DM25 identifies 
source/destination and ascertains bundle validity and freshness as well as APass 
signature verification using DTNNA’s public key. If all conditions are met, DM25 
accepts custody of the bundle and sends acknowledgement (2) appended with hmac to 
RA1. DM25 then replaces the content of access control block with its APass 
(APassDM25) and generated nonce (NDM25) after which it inserts IDDM25 in the CustID 
field. It then computes hmac and append at the end of the bundle as discussed earlier 
before forwarding to RA7. RA7 accesses the bundle content after hmac verification to 
ascertain bundle validity and freshness as well as APass signature verification using 
DTNNA’s public key. If all the conditions are met, it accepts custody and sends 
acknowledgement containing its APass (APassRA7) and the received nonce NDM25 
DM25. RA7 being the destination then proceeds with the decryption of PbRA7{Hello} 
using its private key. Upon receiving acknowledgement, an entity verifies the 
appended hmac with the one it computes and verifies received APass without signature 
verification. The acknowledgement is confirmed as reply to a sent bundle if the 
received nonce matches the sent nonce after which a stored copy of the sent bundle is 
deleted. The recipient of a bundle only verifies the last forwarder on the assumption 
that the last forwarder must have verified the source/previous forwarder before 
accepting custody of the bundle. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: The proposed scheme is compared with the TC 
based protocol by Asokan et al in [8] shown in fig. 4 below.  
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Fig. 4. Compared TC based Authentication Protocol  
The protocol assumes that S knows the public key of KS and R identity IdR prior to 
communication. KS shares a secret key with each entity and the protocol works as 
follows: (1) S generates a random secret key (k) and encrypt a message to have C. k 
and IdR are then encrypted with KS’s public key to have t which is sent together with C 
to R. (2) R forwards t to KS which decrypts (asymmetric) it with its private key to 
access the content and verify IdR. KS then encrypts (symmetric) k retrieved from t with 
the key it shares with R (KSR) to have t’ forwarded to R. R upon receiving t’ decrypts 
(symmetric) it with KSR to retrieve k used to decrypt (symmetric) C to access the 
content. This protocol like the proposed scheme is PKI based combining symmetric 
and asymmetric algorithm and was design for analysis in DTN environment even 
though it was never validated through simulation.  We modelled this protocol and 
implement it for DTN multi-hop communication. During network authentication 
phase, DTNNA generates different symmetric keys it shares with each RA/DM instead 
of Kdtn in the proposed scheme. S’s APass and DTNNA’s APass were included in t and 
t’ to provide source authentication. The access control and primary blocks in the 
bundle are encrypted with randomly generated k to form C. The random key k is used 
to encrypt/decrypt the acknowledgement.   
4   Simulation and Performance Evaluation 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed and compared schemes, the DTN-
satellite scenario in fig. 1 was modeled in C++ using Microsoft Visual Studio 2008 
with security integrated using Crypto++ Cryptographic Library. The modeled 
framework implements hierarchical routing with DTNNA the only source of updates. 
We used Sony VAIO laptop running Windows 7 with the following parameters: Intel 
CoreTM 2 Duo with T5500 Processor @ 1.66GHz speed, 2.50RAM, 120 GB/Go 
HDD and a system type of 32 bit Operating System.   
 
Fig. 5. Simulation result for Number of Contact with DTNNA  
 
Fig. 6. Simulation result for Number of Cryptographic Operations by DTNNA  
Fig. 5 shows the simulation result for the number of contact of the communicating 
entities with DTNNA while fig. 6 shows the number of cryptographic operations 
carried out by DTNNA during bundle transmission. The number of communicating 
entities include one sender, one destination and as many intermediate nodes (DM) as 
possible. While the proposed scheme has zero contact and zero cryptographic 
operations by DTNNA, the number of contacts and cryptographic operations by 
DTNNA for Asokan increases with increase in the number of communicating entities. 
For every contact establish DTNNA carries out three cryptographic operations of 
public key decryption, signature verification and symmetric key encryption.   
5   Conclusion 
We modeled a PKI-based system model with online server (DTNNA) in C++ using 
Microsoft Visual Studio 2008 and Crypto++ Cryptographic Library for security 
integration. We presented and discussed the system model, the proposed APass, 
proposed authentication model and the TC based protocol in [8] considered for 
comparative analysis.  From the simulation results in the last section, we confirmed 
that the TC based protocol in [8] depends on server availability and places more load 
on the server during multi-hop communication. The proposed scheme shows how 
traditional cryptographic techniques can be used judiciously to provide authentication 
and integrity solution that facilitates bundle processing by the recipient without 
depending on server availability. The proposed scheme suits the communication 
satellite because it facilitates onboard switching and processing in addition to 
providing lighter cryptographic operations and limited storage. The only issue with 
our scheme is that the sender will need contact with DTNNA for destination’ public 
key ahead of communication or will have to store the keys.  
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